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Abstract
With the creation of the ‘Common Law Foundation
(CLF)’, a new actor has entered the stage of Private
International Law and international wealth plan-
ning. The recognition of the CLF by other jurisdic-
tions is not self-evident given its mixed legal nature.
Although an independent jurisdiction is free to
create new institutes of law, there is no guarantee
that other jurisdictions will accept the new type
of entity and grant it the desired legal effects. So
far, there is no case law concerning the CLF.
Consequently, guidance must be sought by looking
at comparable legal institutes and the way they were
treated by other jurisdictions, like, for example,
Switzerland and Germany. When it comes to the
question of recognition, there is no room for stereo-
typical solutions.
Introduction
With the creation of the ‘Common Law Foundation’
(CLF) through codifications in a multitude of jurisdic-
tions, especially the so-called ‘offshore jurisdictions’,1 a
new actor has entered the stage of Private International
Law and international wealth planning. From the point
of view of other jurisdictions, eg from the perspective of
Swiss law, this raises the question whether and how a
CLF can be ‘recognised’.2 Although an independent jur-
isdiction is free to create new institutes of law, there is
no guarantee that other jurisdictions will accept the new
type of entity and grant it the desired legal effects, as for
instance the capacity to sue and be sued in court or the
legal independence from its founder that protects the
entity’s assets against the creditors of that founder. The
recognition of the CLF, in particular, is not self-evident
given its mixed legal nature. On the one hand, a CLF
incorporates elements of the Anglo-American trust, on
the other hand it shows traits of a ‘traditional’ Civil Law
foundation.3 For Common Law and Civil Law jurisdic-
tions alike the CLF is, therefore, to some extent a
‘strange animal’. Some critics even denounce CLFs as
camouflaged trusts that have thrown over the coat of a
foundation to mislead Civil Law courts.
A new actor has entered the stage of Private
International Law and international wealth
planning
So far, there is no case law concerning the CLF.
Consequently, guidance must be sought by looking
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at comparable legal institutes and the way they were
treated by other jurisdictions. From the perspective of
the Anglo-American jurisdictions, this raises the ques-
tion to what extent the Common Law case law con-
cerning trusts can be transferred, in the sense of being
applied, to the field of CLFs. From a Civil Law point
of view, it seems worthwhile to discuss civil law in-
stitutes that are comparable to the CLF and their
treatment in the Civil Law jurisdictions. Thus, this
contribution starts off with looking at the recognition
of trusts and Liechtenstein (civil law) foundations4 by
Switzerland and Germany. The outcome of this ana-
lysis is an indicator of how these two jurisdictions,




The first step of this analysis must be a caveat: the
CLF is not a homogeneous phenomenon and it
should not be treated as such. Since CLFs in different
jurisdictions vary5 and since some types of CLF are
particularly close to the trust model whereas others
are closer to the traditional Civil Law foundation, it
would be wrong to automatically treat all types of
CLF the same way. Furthermore, the CLF concept is
quite malleable and how the foundation will look like
in the end thus largely depends on the CLF founder.
In consequence, no CLF is identical to another and,
when it comes to the question of recognition, there is
no room for stereotypical solutions. This short
contribution cannot cover all possible types and vari-
ations of CLF. It only intends to make some guiding
remarks for courts and practitioners who will face the
recognition issue rather sooner than later.
No CLF is identical to another and, when it
comes to the question of recognition, there is
no roomfor stereotypical solutions
Comparison one:The recognition of
trusts
In the field of inheritance law, the Hague Trust
Convention (HTC)6 makes the main difference in
the way Switzerland and Germany deal with the
Anglo-American trust. By adopting the HTC,
Switzerland pledged to recognize foreign-law trusts
as an institute sui generis.7 Even though you cannot
establish a trust under Swiss law, Switzerland basically
treats a trust established under, say, English law the
way English law itself would treat it.8
Under German inheritance law, things look quite
different. At least in cases in which the law applicable
to an estate is German law and the decedent used the
trust as an instrument to administrate and distribute
his assets, the German courts do not recognize the trust
as such. Instead, they re-interpret it as a comparable
German legal institute, eg tail and expectancy (Vor- und
Nacherbschaft) or execution (Testamentsvollstreckung).9
This re-interpretation or ‘transposition’ can be seen
critically as it risks to distort the will of the testator
4. Foundations based on the law of Liechtenstein.
5. For an overview, see J Niegel and R Pease (eds), Private Foundations World Survey (OUP 2013).
6. Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition (‘the Hague Trust Convention’), concluded 1 July 1985, ratification in Switzerland on
1 July 2007.
7. cf P G Picht, ‘Der Erb-trust und die neue EU-Erbverordnung’ in Festschrift für Makoto Arai (2015), D Coester-Waltjen/V Lipp/D Waters (ed), 531–53, 536;
NP Vogt, ‘Trusts und schweizerisches Recht (das Haager Trust Übereinkommen und die neuen Art 149a–e IPRG)’ (2007) Anwaltsrevue 199ff; D Jakob and PG
Picht, ‘Der Trust in der Schweizer Nachlassplanung und Vermögensgestaltung – Materiellrechtliche und internationalprivatrechtliche Aspekte nach der Ratifikation
des HT&Uuml;’ AJP/PJA 7/2010, 856–86; D Jakob and PG Picht, ‘Das Haager Trust-Übereinkommen und seine Geltungseinschränkung – ein Fass der Danaiden?’
in Innovatives Recht, Festschrift für Ivo Schwander (2011), F Lorandi/D Staehelin (ed), 543–62; P Gutzwiller, Trusts für die Schweiz (2007) Anwaltsrevue 156ff; S Wolf
(ed), Der Trust – Einführung und Rechtslage in der Schweiz nach dem Inkrafttreten des Haager Trust-Übereinkommens (2008); D Jakob and PG Picht, ‘Der Einsatz
von Trusts in Vor- und Nacherbschaftskonstellationen – Gedanken zum Zusammenspiel von Haager Trust Übereinkommen und Art 488 Abs. 2 ZGB’ in Privatrecht
als kulturelles Erbe (2012) 175–98; L Thévenoz, ‘Les trusts sont-ils effectivement reconnus en Suisse? Un bilan sept ans après la ratification de la Convention de La
Haye sur les trusts’ (2014) 86 SZW 161.
8. Jakob and Picht (n 7) 856; L Thévenoz, ‘Créer et gérer des trusts en Suisse après l’adoption de la convention de La Haye, in: Journée 2006 de droit bancaire et
financier’ (2007) 51–105; S Wolf and N Jordi, ‘Trust und schweizerisches Zivilrecht – insbesondere Ehegüter-, Erb- und Immobiliarsachenrecht’ in S Wolf (ed)
(n 7) 29–77, 37f; Gutzwiller (n 7) 156.
9. BayObLG 1 February 1980—1 Z 72/79, IPrax 1982, 111; BayObLG 18 March 2003—1 Z BR 71/02, ZEV 2003, 503ff; OLG Frankfurt, Deutsche Notar-
Zeitschrift (DNotZ) (1972) 543; AG Freiburg 3 April 2013—3NG 246/2010; OLG München ZEV 2006, 456; see also: Picht, Festschrift Arai (n 7) 535ff, 546ff.
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since the legal effects of the intended trust will never be
exactly the same as those of the German institutions
being applied after the transposition.
Comparison two:Liechtenstein
foundations
Switzerland and Germany have more in common in
their way of handling Liechtenstein foundations. Both
recognize the Liechtenstein foundation without any
transposition and apply to it Liechtenstein law as
the law under which the foundation was incorpo-
rated.10 This recognition-friendly approach is, how-
ever, restricted by some follow-on limitations, such as
ordre public (public policy protection)11 or manda-
tory national rules.12 To put it briefly, these follow-
on limitations can lead to non-recognition or a
merely partial recognition of the Liechtenstein foun-
dation if the latter violates mandatory rules or the
fundamental notions of justice of the recognizing
state.
In spite of the structural similarities between the
Swiss and the German approaches, however, the two
countries’ focus in recognition practice differs.
German courts, for instance, tend to be quite harsh
on foundations containing ‘black money’ or reserving
for the founder a very strong legal status and influ-
ence.13 From the Swiss perspective, the Liechtenstein
foundation may pose problems if it makes mainten-
ance payments to its beneficiaries. While Article 335
of the Swiss Civil Code (SCC) prohibits maintenance
payments to beneficiaries of a family foundation,14
Liechtenstein law knows no such prohibition.15
Recently, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court has—con-
vincingly, we think16— held that Article 335 SCC
does not qualify as a ‘mandatory rule’ in the sense
of Swiss Conflicts Law and, hence cannot prevent
the recognition of Liechtenstein foundations in
Switzerland.17
Ordre public and mandatory national rules establish
recognition obstacles stemming from the law of the
recognizing state. These limitations must be distin-
guished from limitations that have their origin in
the law of the state of incorporation of the legal in-
stitute. The ‘Sham Doctrine’ regarding trusts18 and
the concept of abuse of rights regarding foundations
belong to this latter group.19
Core questions concerning the
recognition of CLF
What lessons can we draw from this analysis for the
recognition of CLF? We propose five core questions
which may help to organize the numerous and diverse
issues involved and which may form, at the same
time, a kind of roster for assessing the recognisability
of a CLF.
First of all, it has to be analysed whether there exists
transnational law addressing the question of recogni-
tion. Swiss courts, in particular, will have to decide
10. BSK-ZGB I- Grüninger (5th edn, 2014) Art 335 N 16; BGer 3 A_339/2009 v 17 November 2009; OLG Stuttgart (5U 40/09); OLG Düsseldorf 2010 (22 I 126/
06); J Hoffmann, s 10 Stiftungen im Internationalen Privatrecht, in A Richter and T Wachter (eds), Handbuch des internationalen Stiftungsrechts (2007) 183ff,
195mn 28; MünchKomm-BGB-Weitemeyer (7th edn, 2015) s 80, mn 246ff; MünchKomm-BGB-Kindler, IntGesR (6th edn, 2015)mn 315, 676; P Prast,
‘Anerkennung liechtensteinischer juristischer Personen im Ausland’ in H Heiss (ed), Asset Protection: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen am Finanzplatz Liechtenstein –
2. Tagung des Zentrums für liechtensteinisches Recht an der Universität Zürich (2014) 13–58.
11. For a brief explanation, cf: MünchKomm-BGB-v Hein, Einleitung IPR (6th edn, 2015)mn 281; BSK-IPRG-Mächler-Erne and Wolf-Mettier (3rd edn, 2013)
Art 17 N 1ff; vgl BGE 84 I 121ff; BGE 64 II 98; BGE 76 I 129; BGE 78 II 251.
12. For a brief explanation, cf: MünchKomm-BGB-v Hein, ibid, mn 286ff; BSK-IPRG-Mächler-Erne and Wolf-Mettier, ibid, Art 18, 19.
13. BGE 135 III 614 (E 4); D Jakob, ‘Ein Stiftungsbegriff für die Schweiz’ (2013) 132 ZSR II, 185–340, 234ff; Jakob and Picht (n 7) 863ff.
14. KUKO ZGB-Jakob (1st edn, 2011) art 335 N 4ff.
15. D Jakob, Schutz der Stiftung: Die Stiftung und ihre Rechtsverhältnisse im Widerstreit der Interessen (2006), Mohr Siebeck, 55.
16. Some literature to the same effect: Jakob and Picht (n 7) 855, 863ff; S Herzog, Trusts und schweizerisches Erbrecht, Einschränkungen bei der Anerkennung von
Trusts aus der Perspektive des schweizerischen Erbrechts – unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Pflichtteilen und deren prozessualer Durchsetzung (2016), Schulthess
Verlag, 150.
17. BGE 135 III 614 E.4.3. ‘. . . le combat contre l’oisiveté n’a plus rien à voir avec la sauvegarde d’intérêts supérieurs. . . .’; affirmative annotation to this judgment:
Jakob and Picht (n 7) 855, 863ff.
18. T Haeusler, ’Einführung in den angelsächsischen Trust’ in Richter and Wachter (n 10) 229, 242ff, mn 66ff, s 12.
19. cf FL-OGH, 3 C 388/96-25, s 916mn 5; FL-OGH, 01 CG. 2008. 156, 7.2.2.; FL-OGH, 9 C 130/99-47, 6.4.4; FL-OGH on 3 November 2005, LES 2006, 373ff; M
Büch, Durchgriff und Stiftung: Eine Untersuchung der Rechtsfigur des Haftungsdurchgriffs im liechtensteinischen Recht im Kontext der Rechtsform Stiftung (2015) 38ff;
H Bösch, Die liechtensteinische Treuhänderschaft zwischen Trust und Treuhand (1995) 471ff.
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whether the HTC applies to CLFs as well. In our view,
an outright application is problematic20 given the
substantial differences between CLFs and trusts.
Legal capacity, in particular, is a typical feature of
the CLF while typical trusts do not possess it.
Nonetheless, some underlying principles of the HTC
may have an impact on the recognition of CLFs.
Secondly, if the HTC cannot be applied directly, the
national provisions on Conflicts of Laws must be con-
sulted to determine the applicable law. This depends
on how the court of recognition ‘qualifies’21 the CLF
and which Conflicts rule it consequently uses for
identifying the substantive law that is to govern the
CLF at issue. Whether the CLF can be qualified—as it
is the case for traditional foundations22—as a particu-
lar form of ‘corporation’ depends in part on the con-
crete organization of the respective CLF. Given that
CLFs are usually equipped with substantial legal in-
dependence vis-à-vis their founders and organs, how-
ever, a qualification as ‘corporation’ within the
meaning of the term applied by the Conflicts rules
ought to be the usual outcome. The factor determin-
ing the law applicable to ‘corporations’ can vary de-
pending on the recognizing jurisdiction: in Swiss law,
the law of incorporation would have priority pursu-
ant to Article 154 Swiss Federal Code on Private
International Law (CPIL).23 The German Conflicts
of Laws provision regarding ‘corporations’ would in-
stead focus on the legal seat where the jurisdiction of
origin of the CLF is not part of the European Union
or the European Economic Area.24 This can hold sur-
prises for the persons involved. If, for instance, a
foundation was established in Jersey but maintains
its legal seat in Frankfurt on the Main, German law
would be applicable—probably not the outcome in-
tended by the founder. Fourthly, the court must
consider whether the CLF can be recognized as a
legal institute sui generis or whether a transposition
seems necessary, for instance into a fiduciary relation-
ship lacking legal capacity. Finally, and particularly in
case of a sui generis recognition, follow-on limitations
such as ordre public or sham must be taken into
consideration.
If the HTC cannot be applied directly, the na-
tional provisions on Conflicts of Laws must be
consulted to determine the applicable law
The court must consider whether the CLF can
be recognized as a legal institute sui generis or
whether a transposition seems necessary, for
instance into a fiduciary relationship lacking
legalcapacity
Transposition and limitations to
recognition
The fourth of the aforementioned questions deserves
particular attention, ie the consideration whether the
recognizing state is prepared for a veritable recogni-
tion of a foreign-law CLF or just for a transposition.
In Swiss law, the HTC principles should have an
impact on this decision. As Switzerland has pledged,
through Article 11 HTC, to recognize even the trust25
which is less close to Swiss law concepts than the CLF,
it would be inconsequent if the CLF were not to en-
counter at least the same acceptance.26 This argument
does not apply to German law, though. On the con-
trary, the German practice of transposition regarding
the inheritance trust might suggest a transposition of
CLFs that are particularly similar to trusts. Such a
practice would, however, deserve sharp criticism
20. Against an analogous application: J Niegel, ‘Editorial On Foundations and Chameleons’ (2013) 19 Trusts & Trustees 497, 502; J Niegel, ‘Editorial:
Accompanying Private Foundations Over A Decade: Reception – Recognition – Harmonization Issues’ (2014) 20 Trusts & Trustees 503, 507 (n 16).
21. General reference on the concept of ‘qualification’: MünchKomm-BGB-v Hein (n 11), mn 108ff.
22. cf German Federal Court BGH, 8 September 2016 – III ZR 7/15.
23. cf Swiss Federal Code on Private International Law (CPIL), SR 2915http://www.umbricht.ch/en/cpil/> (accessed 13 December 2016); references to the Swiss
incorporation theory: BSK-IPRG- Eberhard v Planta (3rd edn 2013) Art 154 N 9; IPRG-Kommentar-Vischer, Art 154 N 19; KUKO ZGB-Jakob (n 15), Art 335 N
18; BGE 117 II 494; A Heini, SZW 1993, 64.
24. MünchKomm-BGB-Kindler, Int GesR (6th edn 2015)mn 358, 142; German Federal Court BGH, 27 October 2008—II ZR 158/06 (’Trabrennbahn’) ¼ BGHZ
178, 192.
25. cf Annex.
26. In favour of recognition also Niegel (n 20); 503.
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since it would neither reflect the founder’s will, nor
comply with the fundamental private international
law doctrine of comity,27 guaranteeing the respect
and openness towards foreign jurisdictions.
Whether follow-on limitations interfere with the
recognition of the CLF depends in part on decisions
made by the founder. He should refrain from estab-
lishing excessive control rights for himself or from
the inclusion of fiscally doubtful assets. In contrast,
the maintenance character of a CLF should not be a
hindrance to its recognition in Germany or
Switzerland. Even if follow-on limitations are trig-
gered, they do not necessarily result in a complete
refusal of recognition. A kind of ‘selective recogni-
tion’ may deny legal validity to certain elements of
the CLF only. The principles underlying Article 15
HTC, such as the protection of minors, of spouses,
of persons entitled to statutory shares or of insolv-
ency creditors, may indicate fields where a selective
non-recognition could occur. This can be unfortu-
nate for founders who intend, by using a CLF, to
protect their assets from the groups of persons
named in Article 15 HTC. Where follow-on limita-
tions clash with the CLF’s statutes or the provisions
of the respective CLF jurisdiction, the (partial) non-
recognition ordered by the ‘recognising’ jurisdic-
tion is not unlikely to prevail in the end, at least
where the foundation’s assets are physically located
not ‘offshore’ but in Zurich, Frankfurt, or London
and thus form an easy target for enforcement
measures.
Whether follow-on limitations interfere with
the recognition of the CLF depends in part on
decisionsmade by the founder
Summary
It seems likely that many types of CLFs will find at
least limited recognition in Switzerland and Germany.
It is much harder to predict details, for instance where
courts may use follow-on limitations to deny recog-
nition to certain (parts of) individual CLFs.
Legislators of CLF jurisdictions and prospective CLF
founders are—if they want to increase the chance of
recognition—well advised to show moderation in the
extent they deviate from classical foundation con-
cepts. Recognition states are called upon to take
into account their existing practice of recognition re-
garding legal entities similar to the CLF while, on the
other hand, abstaining from a ‘mechanical’ transfer of
existing schemes to the CLF. The CLF is an independ-
ent and a new legal institute that deserves an assess-
ment in its own right. Recognition-friendliness
should be a leading principle in this exercise.
Doubts in individual cases may be eliminated by
means of specific follow-on limitations. A ‘Hague
CLF Convention’ will, if it ever sees the light of day,
take a long time to come into force.
Until then, recognition states as well as CLF juris-
dictions have to rely on an interaction which should be
characterized by cooperation and mutual openness.
Legislators of CLF jurisdictions and prospective
CLF founders areçif they want to increase
the chance of recognitionçwell advised to
show moderation in the extent they deviate
fromclassical foundation concepts
The CLF is an independent and a new legal in-
stitute that deserves an assessment in its own
right.Recognition-friendlinessshouldbealead-
ing principle in this exercise
Annex
Article 11 HTC:
A trust created in accordance with the law specified by
the preceding Chapter shall be recognised as a trust.
Such recognition shall imply, as a minimum, that the
trust property constitutes a separate fund, that the trus-
tee may sue and be sued in his capacity as trustee, and
27. On comity in general: J K Bleimaier, ‘The Doctrine of Comity in Private International Law’ (2012) 24 Catholic Lawyer 327.
Trusts & Trustees, Vol. 23, No. 6, July 2017 General articles 625
that he may appear or act in this capacity before a
notary or any person acting in an official capacity.
In so far as the law applicable to the trust requires or
provides, such recognition shall imply, in particular -
a. that personal creditors of the trustee shall have no
recourse against the trust assets;
b. that the trust assets shall not form part of the trus-
tee’s estate upon his insolvency or bankruptcy;
c. that the trust assets shall not form part of the
matrimonial property of the trustee or his spouse
nor part of the trustee’s estate upon his death;
d. that the trust assets may be recovered when the
trustee, in breach of trust, has mingled trust assets
with his own property or has alienated trust assets.
However, the rights and obligations of any third
party holder of the assets shall remain subject to
the law determined by the choice of law rules of
the forum.
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